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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 18-2834 
__________ 
 
FRANK M. MONTE, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
DETECTIVE JOE KESSLING, Individually and in his official capacity, of the Broward 
County Sheriff's Office, State of Florida; HONORABLE LISA PORTER, Individually 
and in their official capacity, as County Judge of the 17th Judicial Circuit State of 
Florida, Broward County; CHRISTOPHER W. POLE, Individually and in their official 
capacity, as County Judge of the 17th Judicial Circuit State of Florida, Broward County; 
MICHAEL J. SATZ, Individually and in his official capacity as State Attorney for the 
17th Judicial Circuit State of Florida, Broward County; CHRISTOPHER KILLORAN, 
Individually and in his official capacity as Assistant State Attorney for the 17th Judicial 
Circuit State of Florida, Broward County; FREDERIC M. KNAPP, Individually and in 
his official Capacity, Morris County Prosecutor of the State of New Jersey; STATE OF 
FLORIDA; STATE OF NEW JERSEY; RICHARD LYNN SCOTT, Governor of the 
State of  Florida; PAMELA JO BONDI, Attorney General of the State of  Florida; 
PHILIP DUNTON MURPHY, Governor of the State of New Jersey; GURBIR S. 
GREWAL, Attorney General of the State of New Jersey 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:18-cv-11363) 
District Judge:  Honorable John M. Vazquez 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 14, 2018 
 
Before:  KRAUSE, SCIRICA and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: December 19, 2018) 
___________ 
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OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Pro se appellant Frank M. Monte appeals from the judgment of the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissing his complaint pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).  For the following reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the 
District Court. 
 Monte sought to file an in forma pauperis (“ifp”) complaint in the District Court, 
raising claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 related to an arrest and detention in Florida.  
The District Court allowed him to proceed ifp and, on screening, the District Court 
dismissed the complaint and Monte’s subsequently submitted amendment without 
prejudice for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).   
 Monte filed a second amended complaint, naming as defendants the states of 
Florida and New Jersey, a detective and judges in Florida, prosecutors in Florida and 
New Jersey, and the Attorneys General and Governors of both states.  He generally 
alleged that defendants did not have “Competent Jurisdiction” to conduct an investigation 
and to arrest him in Florida, as he is a citizen of New Jersey.  More specifically, Monte 
alleged that defendants maintained an unconstitutional policy (Count I), violated his due 
process and equal protection rights (Count II), and engaged in intentional misconduct by 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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falsely arresting and falsely imprisoning him (Count III).  The District Court dismissed 
the second amended complaint with prejudice, pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), for failure 
to state a claim.  Monte appeals.1 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the District 
Court’s sua sponte dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is plenary.  See Allah v. 
Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  Where a complaint has not alleged 
sufficient facts to state a claim for relief that is “plausible on its face[,]” dismissal is 
appropriate.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation and quotation marks 
omitted).   
 The District Court properly dismissed Monte’s second amended complaint 
pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).  Regarding Count I, wherein Monte alleged that 
defendants maintained an unconstitutional policy, nowhere did Monte specify the 
particular policy or custom at issue.  See McTernan v. City of York, 564 F.3d 636, 657–
58 (3d Cir. 2009).  In the District Court’s first order dismissing the complaint without 
prejudice, it stated, “[t]he Court cannot tell from [Monte’s] allegations what policy [he] 
believes is unconstitutional, and it will not guess.”  Dkt # 3, at 5.  Monte did not clarify 
what policy he was referring to in his subsequent amended complaint (or in his brief on 
appeal). 
                                                                                                                                                  
 
1 On August 30, 2018, Monte filed a motion for emergency relief pending appeal in this 
Court, which was construed as a motion for a stay pending appeal.  His motion was 
subsequently denied. 
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 In Count II, Monte alleged that his equal protection and due process rights were 
violated.  The District Court properly determined that Monte failed to allege any facts 
showing that he was treated differently from similarly situated persons, and therefore 
failed to state an equal protection claim.  See Williams v. Morton, 343 F.3d 212, 221 (3d 
Cir. 2003) (“To prevail on an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must present evidence 
that s/he has been treated differently from persons who are similarly situated.”) (citing 
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)).   
 Similarly, Monte failed to state a due process claim.  It is not entirely clear what 
action allegedly violated Monte’s due process rights.  Even if we liberally construe the 
complaint to include a due process challenge related to the false arrest and false 
imprisonment claims in Count III, as the District Court did, Monte failed to state a claim.  
Monte did not allege any facts to show that either his arrest or imprisonment was made 
without probable cause.2  See James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 680, 682–83 
(3d Cir. 2012) (analyzing false arrest and false imprisonment claims similarly, requiring a 
showing that (1) that plaintiff was arrested/detained, and (2) that the arrest/detention was 
made without probable cause).  To the extent that Monte alleged an intentional tort claim 
in Count III, the District Court correctly determined that Monte failed to plead any of the 
elements of an intentional tort or to allege any facts to support such a cause of action. 
                                              
2 Monte included the arrest warrant, and affidavit supporting the arrest warrant, for his 
2017 arrest as attachments to his second amended complaint.  These documents suggest 
that there was, in fact, probable cause for his arrest and detention.  See dkt # 4, at 29–33 
(PDF page numbers). 
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 Furthermore, we find no error with the District Court’s decision to dismiss the 
second amended complaint with prejudice, as providing any further opportunity to amend 
would have been futile.  See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d 
Cir. 2002).  Monte has already filed two amended complaints, and has failed to cure the 
defects in each amendment. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.3 
 
                                              
3 Although the District Court dismissed Monte’s complaint before any of the defendants 
were served, one defendant has appeared on appeal and presents a motion to supplement 
the appendix, which we grant. 
